One of the important topics that has made thinkers of the philosophy of religion contemplate by its own nature or as a reaction to constructivists – who believe in the subjectivity and non-Objectivity of God – is the reality  or – more scientifically stated – Objectivity of the Transcendental Being. ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī is one of the thinkers in this arena the rereading of whose thought can help explain his approach to the question of God’s Objectivity. After the explanation of the theoretical framework of Objectivity, we have explained, reread, and analyzed ‘Allāma’s thought in the domain of God’s Objectivity. The results show that ‘Allāma has addressed Objectivity in the discussions of ontology, epistemology (on the accuracy of beliefs related to God), and semantics (on the congruence of propositions with the External Being of God as a true and real Matter). The triple concepts of Objectivity – i.e., Transcendental Being, Transcendental belief, and Transcendental proposition – in ‘Allāma’s thought means that God’s Being and Essence is independent from mind (Transcendental Being), the belief or statement about God is metaphysically objective (Transcendental epistemology), and the proposition about God can be evaluated by checking its truthfulness/falsity (Transcendental proposition).

The idea that science is objective, or able to achieve Objectivity, is in large part responsible for the role that science plays within society. But what is Objectivity? The idea of Objectivity is ambiguous. This paper distinguishes between three basic forms of Objectivity. The first form of Objectivity is ontological Objectivity: the world as it is in itself does not depend upon what we think about it; it is independent of human thought, language, conceptual activity or experience. The second form of Objectivity is the Objectivity of truth: truth does not depend upon what we believe or justifiably believe; truth depends upon the way reality itself is. The third form of Objectivity is epistemic Objectivity: this form of Objectivity resides in the scientific method which ensures that subjective factors are excluded, and only epistemically relevant factors play a role in scientific inquiry. The paper considers two problems that arise for the notion of epistemic Objectivity: the theory-dependence of observation and the variability of the methods of science. It is argued that the use of shared standard procedures ensures the Objectivity of observation despite theory-dependence. It is argued that the variability of methods need not lead to an epistemic relativism about science. The paper concludes with the realist suggestion that the best explanation of the success of the sciences is that the methods employed in the sciences are highly reliable truth-conducive tools of inquiry. The Objectivity of the methods of the sciences leads to the objective truth about the objective world.

Two meanings regarding the principality of existence (isālat al-wujūd) can be inferred from the works and words of Mulla Sadra. One meaning is the Objectivity of existence and essence on which many issues of Transcendental philosophy are based. This meaning has deep philosophical consequences and implications. It seems that this meaning causes certain problems which make its acceptance tricky. The present article applies a systematic approach to Transcendental philosophy as a whole in order to examine the above-mentioned theory, its functions, its knowledge-based implications and the possibility of a philosophical support for this meaning. As a result, accepting this meaning as the ultimate idea of Mulla Sadra about the principality of existence will philosophically have numerous weaknesses and problems.

The unity of Being is one the most important doctrines of mystics that provoked many challenges in area of religious belief and philosophy. Mulla sadra as a founder of philosophical system called Transcendental philosophy claims that he has much success in explaining this mystical doctrine. But his followers disagreed over his meaning. Some of them claimed that the theory of equivocal unity of Being was the only rational explanation of mystic’s doctrine of unity of Being. Other claimed that mystic’s doctrine means the individual unity of Being that negates plurality of Beings. In this essay, after brief indication of history and development of mystic’s doctrine, different interpretations of Mulla sadra view concerning this doctorine are examined. semantical examination is used to show which interpretation is defensible.

Intellectual and moral virtues are among the most important issues in contemporary anthropology. They play a key role in characterizing Transcendental human Being and his spiritual perfection. As a meritorious and pragmatic philosopher, Imam Khomeini recounts diversified characteristics for Transcendental human Being, many of which are collectable under intellectual and moral virtues. The four pillars of virtues, its intellectual and moral branches, their indefiniteness and ways for acquiring them, role of moderation in virtues and the status of virtue in human communities are among themes of interest for Imam Khomeini. Like Mulla Sadra, Imam Khomeini places science atop intellectual virtues as he places justice at the top of the moral virtues. Resorting to document analysis in its methodology, this paper intends to clarify Imam Khomeini’s exclusive approach in using the pivotal concept of fitrat (innate disposition) in defining virtues that was generalized into prioritizing practical science over theoretical science throughout his own school of thought as an innovation exclusive to Imam Khomeini. His double emphasis on moral virtues versus intellectual virtues has augmented his attention to the formation of ideological utopia in line with virtuous life of human archetype. The supremacy of his fitrat-oriented and pragmatic approach generalized virtues from individual domain to political and social arenas. To him, purification of the soul is a key factor for virtuousness and darkness of mind and ignorance are obstacles to real virtues and proximity to God. In Imam Khomeini’s view, virtuousness of man is so colorful that one can term his method of anthropology as virtuous anthropology.

In this paper, showing the relations between the conditions of Objectivity and its foundational components in Husser's philosophy, I wan to reveal their mutual and dialectical relationship. Transcendental consciousness and its intentional structure are the main conditions of the possibility of Objectivity. The body, time, and perception have been considered to be the other principle conditions of the possibility of Objectivity. Based on these conditions, the foundational components of Objectivity can be considered. These components are: identity, transcendence, lawfulness or regularity and intersubjective community. This study shows that the Objectivity of conditions and components in itself are related to each other, and there is a mutual relation between them. Investigating the Objectivity of consciousness in philosophy of Husserl regardless of the mutual relation would be ignoring the importance of Husserl's attitude on consciousness and its Objectivity. The essence of consciousness is the intentionality. The other properties of consciousness results from the intentionality. Conditions of Objectivity are related to the noetic pole of consciousness and components of Objectivity to the noematic pole of it.

Seyyed Heidar Amoli with developing of Ibn-Arabi theoretical mysticism proposed a kind of ontology can be named pure ontology. Pure ontology is not a mere approach beside the others. It is a truth that goes beyond any concept extension attitude about Being. Being is objective but not that of which is against subjective. It goes beyond the object subject opposition. This can be a solve for the paradox of Objectivity-subjectivity of the Being. Subject is against object, but it is itself an object, so it means it is an object and it is not.Solving this paradox with paying attention to Amoli ontology, perfects with encompassing of contrary distinction theory of Ibn-Turkeh Isfahani.

This paper examines the work of Immanuel Kant in the light of a new theory on the nature of truth, knowledge and falsehood (the Inversion Theory of Truth). Kant’s idea that knowledge could be absolutely certain, and that its truth must correspond with reality, is discredited by a dissection of the Correspondence Theory of Truth. This examination of the nature of truth, as well as knowledge and falsehood, is conducted with reference to Sir Karl Popper’s writings on regulative ideas, the criterion of demarcation and the principle of falsifiability. It is argued that if truth is to be regarded as certain, it should be used to describe objects and events in the objective (noumenal) state, and that subjective knowledge must contain (and is improved by) falsehood. Perceptions and knowledge are obtained by the biological and evolutionary process of Active Subjectivism. Ideas we have knowledge of can be metaphysical or scientific, according to Popper’s Criterion of Demarcation. Kant’s “Copernican revolution” claim that our intellect imposes absolutely true laws on nature could not allow for the possibility that ideas might be constructed from fallible perceptions, and hence that all knowledge is uncertain. Instead, he developed a Critique of Practical Reason in which religion, though not provable through logical reasoning, could be proved by our innate moral sense, giving us a Categorical Imperative that could lead to perverse results. By rejecting the absolute certainty of a priori knowledge, and admitting a degree of essential falsehood, we arrive at a more reasonable grounding for moral behavior.

This paper deals with the following issues while comparing two terms, i. e., and Being in Illuminative Philosophy. 1-Equality or uneqality of light and Being in Illuminative Philosophy. 2- The explanation of Suhravardi"s reasoning about the simplicity of light and its sufficiency of definition and Mulla Sadra"s criticism of those reasonings. 3- The Suhravardi"s argument about the analyticity (tashkik) of lights and an analysis of the contradiction between the analyticity of lights and mentally- posited Being. 4- The kinds of lights in illuminative philosophy and Mulla Sadra"s points of view regarding this categorization. 5- The opposition between light and darkness in the Illuminative Philosophy. 6- The process of understanding the truth of light.

In general, there are two current views on the interpretation of the concept of Objectivity in Frege. The first view addresses Objectivity in the realm of ontology in which the Objectivity is independent of everything even human reason. According to this view, one could call Frege’s philosophy a realist philosophy. On the contrary, the second view sees Objectivity or the objective in the realm of epistemology, in which the objective is accessible to human reason as an intersubjective thing. Comparing these two views, we would show that every interpretation that regards the Objectivity as intersubjectivity would lead to Kant’s Transcendental idealism and introduces Frege as a critical philosopher in its Kantian sense. Besides entering theoretical inadequacy in the totality of Ferege’s thought, such an interpretation is incompatible with his philosophy of arithmetic, as, for example, Frege argues that arithmetic as a branch of logic cannot be based on intuition. Accordingly, believing in internal consistency of Frege’s philosophy of arithmetic, we make use of necessary evidence to emphasize on ontological interpretation of the Objectivity of thought in his views.